The Rhetorical Tapestry of Race: White Innocence and Black Abstraction by Ross, Thomas
William & Mary Law Review
Volume 32 | Issue 1 Article 2
The Rhetorical Tapestry of Race: White Innocence
and Black Abstraction
Thomas Ross
Copyright c 1990 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr
Repository Citation
Thomas Ross, The Rhetorical Tapestry of Race: White Innocence and Black Abstraction, 32 Wm. & Mary
L. Rev. 1 (1990), http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol32/iss1/2
William and Mary
Law Review
VOLUME 32 FALL 1990 NUMBER 1
THE RHETORICAL TAPESTRY OF RACE: WHITE
INNOCENCE AND BLACK ABSTRACTION
THOMAS Ross*
Nineteenth-century Americans lived in a truly racist society.
Racist talk and racial epithets were accepted forms of public
discourse. Black persons were first enslaved, and later segregated
and subjugated, by law. And their Supreme Court sanctioned all
of this in the name of the Constitution. In matters of race, the
period was shameful and tragic for the Court and the culture.
We live in a different time. Expressions of racial inferiority and
other racist talk are no longer accepted forms of public discourse.
De jure segregation is gone. And our Supreme Court, however
controversial some of its decisions on race, seems to be proceeding
in a responsible manner. Whatever our shortcomings and disap-
pointments on matters of race, few of us suppose that we are
creating a history for which those who follow will feel a sense of
tragedy and shame comparable to that which we feel for the Court
and culture of the previous century.
The purpose of this paper is to shake this comfortable sense of
assurance about our historical standing and thus encourage us to
rethink our choices about race. I hope to bring about this discom-
fort, and this rethinking, by showing that the essential rhetorical
themes of the nineteenth-century cases we now discredit are the
themes of our contemporary cases. When we see that we talk and
argue about race in much the same way as our predecessors whose
* Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law. B.A., University of Virginia,
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choices stain our legal history, we shall have good reason to rethink
our own choices.
Part I of this paper explores the nature of legal rhetoric and
defines the two rhetorical themes that are interwoven within the
rhetorical tapestry of race, then and now. These themes are "white
innocence," the insistence on the innocence of contemporary whites,'
and "black abstraction," the refusal to depict blacks in any real
and vividly drawn social context. Part II lays out the rhetoric of
white innocence and black abstraction in several of the most
infamous nineteenth-century race cases. Part III does the same
for several of the most important contemporary cases. In Part IV,
I examine in more depth the cultural significance and power of
the ideas of white innocence and black abstraction and argue that
these ideas have no proper place in our legal discourse about race.
Part V concludes with the hopeful possibilities that arise from an
alternative discourse: the discourse of narrative.
I. THE MAGIC OF LEGAL RHETORIC
Rhetoric is a magical thing. It transforms things into their
opposites. Difficult choices become obvious. Change becomes con-
tinuity. Real human suffering vanishes as we conjure up the
specter of righteousness. Rhetoric becomes the smooth veneer to
the cracked surface of the real and hard choices in law.
The excellent lawyer is always a master rhetorician. In a mo-
ment, she can construct multiple arguments for any given position.
She can respond to assaults and make her own devastating attacks
on the rhetoric of others. She seems to have an almost instinctive
feel for rhetoric, spotting the suppressed and problematic premise
in an argument like a predator sensing the weak animal in a herd
of prey.
This rhetorical facility is no happenstance. It is a product of
our legal culture and history. Our culture has elevated the art of
rhetoric to a central position. Although we are not unique in our
need to make and to justify hard choices, perhaps no other
contemporary group so worships the art of rhetoric.
The significance of rhetoric is evident, for example, in the
manner by which we define our cultural heroes. Our heroes are
our great judges. The judges who have an unambiguous claim to
being heroes are those we see as excellent in both choice and
rhetoric.
1. See Ross, Innocence and Affirmative Action, 43 VAND. L. REV. 297 (1990).
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Robert Ferguson ascribed to Holmes, our most obvious hero,
and to all judges who would be great, the dual cultural role of
warrior and magician.2 The judge first makes the hard choice, the
act of the warrior. He then turns to us and makes that choice
intellectually coherent and thus tolerable by his rhetoric, the act
of the magician.3 This metaphorical description of the essence of
great judging reveals the centrality of rhetoric.
The greatest challenge for the judge as rhetorician is to make
coherent the choices that might divide us as a community. The
greatest of those kinds of challenges throughout our legal history
have been those triggered by race. From Dred Scott v. Sandford4
through the most recent affirmative action cases, judges have
tried desperately to make smooth the cracked surface of the law's
response to race relations.5 The stakes have always been fright-
eningly high. The apparent paradoxes have made the rhetorical
work daunting. In Dred Scott, Chief Justice Taney's awful magic
imposed a coherence on the paradox of the choice to deny black
persons the status of "citizens" within a society ostensibly devoted
to the principle of individual human freedom. Again and again in
our legal history, we have seen the rhetorical magic spun around
the choices of race, obscuring the conflicts and paradoxes, smooth-
ing over choices for which we would later feel nothing but shame.
These special challenges produced a special rhetoric: the legal
rhetoric of race.6 The legal rhetoric of race exhibits much variety.
Each judge, each case, each choice produced a unique magic. Yet,
a pattern emerges out of this tapestry of our legal rhetoric of
race. The legal rhetoric of race embodies two central themes:
white innocence and black abstraction.
White innocence is the insistence on the innocence or absence
of responsibility of the contemporary white person. The rhetoric
of the nineteenth-century judges advanced this idea of white
innocence in various ways. This idea also could be found in the
2. See Ferguson, Holmes and the Judicial Figure, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 506, 517 (1988).
3. Id.
4. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
5. See G. MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN DEMOCRACY
523-34 (1962); Kennedy, Persuasion and Distrust: A Comment on the Affirmative Action
Debate, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1327, 1327 (1986) (stating that for more than a decade "the coalition
principally responsible for the Civil Rights Revolution ... has been riven by bitter
disagreement over the means by which American society should attempt to overcome its
racist past").
6. See, e.g., Miller, Constitutional Law and the Rhetoric of Race, in 5 PERSPECTIVES IN
AMERICAN HISTORY 147-200 (D. Fleming & B. Bailyn eds. 1971).
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rhetoric outside the judicial context. 7 The proslavery rhetorician
who grounded his argument in the denial of the humanness of the
slave, in the reduction of the slave to a chattel, was insisting on
his own innocence. Slavery was not, for him, a matter of subju-
gation and denial of the principle of freedom. Slavery was instead
a natural, even moral, disposition of another species of creature.
In this vision, slavery no more tainted the white person than did
the penning and use of his cattle.8
7. In an essay published in 1832, Thomas R. Dew, professor at the College of William
and Mary, set forth what has been described as the "most thorough and comprehensive
justification of the institution [of slavery]" produced to that time. G. FREDRICKSON, THE
BLACK IMAGE IN THE WHITE MIND: THE DEBATE ON AFRo-AMERICAN CHARACTER AND DESTINY
44 (1971) [hereinafter BLACK IMAGE]. Dew described slavery as something imposed upon the
contemporary white society and as nothing for which they should feel any sense of reproach:
If ever [a] nation stood justified before Heaven, in regard to an evil, which
had become interwoven with her social system, is not that country ours? Are
not our hands unpolluted with the original sin . . .? Where is the stain that
rests upon our escutcheon? There is none . . . ! Virginia . . . has nothing to
reproach herself with-"the still small voice of conscience" can never disturb
her quiet. She truly stands upon this subject like the Chevalier Bayard-"sans
peur et sans reproche."
T. DEW, REVIEW OF THE DEBATE IN THE VIRGINIA LEGISLATURE OF 1831 AND 1832, at 45-46
(reprinted by Negro Universities Press 1970). The Chevalier Bayard was a French soldier
of the late fifteenth, early sixteenth century. The hero of many battles, Bayard lived a life
of near-mythical dimensions. "To his contemporaries he was the faultless knight-heroic,
devout, generous, and kindly." 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITTANICA 978-79 (1990). The Chev-
alier Bayard thus was the perfect model for the southern white seeking to express his
innocence.
A spokesperson for abolition, Thomas Marshall of Virginia, used his own version of white
innocence in debates in the Virginia House of Delegates in 1832:
We believe that there is not the slightest moral turpitude in holding slaves
under existing circumstances in the south. We know too that the ordinary
conditions of slaves in Virginia is not such as to make humanity weep for his
lot. Our solicitations to the slaveholders, it will be perceived, are founded but
little on the miseries of the blacks. We direct ourselves almost exclusively to
the injuries slavery inflicts on the whites.
The Speech of Thomas Marshall, in the House of Delegates of Virginia, on the Abolition of
Slavery, 12 Am. Q. REV. 383 (1832).
8. Professor George M. Fredrickson has written several particularly illuminating books
on the history and nature of racism. See G. FREDRICKSON, THE ARROGANCE OF RACE:
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON SLAVERY, RACISM, AND SOCIAL INEQUALITY (1988) [hereinafter
ARROGANCE]; BLACK IMAGE, supra note 7. His essay, Masters and Mudsills: The Role of Race
in the Planter Ideology of South Carolina, powerfully describes a particular metaphorical
version of racism-the "mud-sill" theory. G. FREDRICKSON, Masters and Mudsills: The Role
of Race in the Planter Ideology of South Carolina, in ARROGANCE 15-27 (1988). Fredrickson
quotes from a speech that Senator Hammond of South Carolina delivered in the United
States Senate in 1858:
In all social systems there must be a class to do the menial duties, to
perform the drudgery of life. That is a class requiring but a low order of
intellect and but little skill. Its requisites are vigor, docility, fidelity. Such a
class you must have . . . . It constitutes the very mud-sill of society ....
THE RHETORICAL TAPESTRY OF RACE
For the judges whose racism was less virulent, the rhetoric
embodying white innocence had to have a more sophisticated
structure. The legal rhetorician often made the premise of white
innocence an implicit conclusion. White innocence was nonetheless
an important theme. For example, in Taney's reliance on a form
of originalism in his interpretation of the Constitution in Dred
Scott, he was able to push responsibility away from himself and
contemporary whites in general and back to the preceding gen-
erations who had so thoroughly subjugated the black person, at
least in Taney's story, that Taney and his contemporaries had no
choice but to conclude that the Constitution could not have in-
cluded the black person as a citizen.9
Both originalism and, more generally, the assertion of judicial
helplessness are not unique to the cases about race. Originalism
interpretive theory in various forms has been a constant piece of
the constitutional rhetoric throughout American legal history.10
The idea of judicial helplessness implied in the principle of prec-
edent is one of the central myths of our law, with all the real
power of any large myth." The rhetoric of white innocence is thus
created out of several familiar rhetorical tools.
White innocence was a rhetorically created myth. First, the
judicial helplessness version of white innocence exemplified by
Taney's opinion in Dred Scott was a charade. Taney could have
chosen otherwise; this is the nature of a choice. Second, the version
of white innocence that cast the contemporary whites as free of
responsibility or guilt was just not sensible. The institution of
slavery preceding the Civil War and the institution of de jure
segregation in the aftermath of emancipation were each the prod-
uct of an ongoing collective choice by then contemporary whites
not to intervene. The rhetoric of white innocence permitted white
magicians to pretend for themselves, and for their white contem-
Fortunately for the South we have found a race adapted to that purpose to
her hand . . . . Our slaves are black, of another, inferior race. The status in
which we have placed them is an elevation. They are elevated from the
condition in which God first created them by being made our slaves.
Id. at 23.
9. See infra notes 23-32 and accompanying text.
10. See, e.g., R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977); Kay, Adherence to the Original
Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, 82 Nw. U.L. REV.
226 (1988); Rotunda, Original Intent, the View of the Framers, and the Role of the Ratifiers,
41 VAND. L. REV. 507 (1988). But see Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent,
98 HARV. L. REV. 885 (1985).
11. See R. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 232-38 (1975).
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poraries, that the horrific circumstances of the blacks were, after
all, not the white person's fault.
The second theme in the nineteenth-century legal rhetoric of
race is black abstraction. Black abstraction is the rhetorical depic-
tion of the black person in an abstract context, outside of any real
and rich social context. Although abstraction is a rhetorical tool
not unique to the rhetoric of race, it proved especially useful in
the race cases. Black abstraction pervaded the rhetoric of race in
the nineteenth century. For example, the assertion that a law that
segregates by race does not connote racial inferiority makes sense
only in the abstract context created in Plessy v. Ferguson.12 By
not placing the black person in the real social context of the late
nineteenth century, Justice Brown was able to say with a straight
face that any racial stigma flowing from de jure segregation simply
must be self-imposed. 13
The power of black abstraction is that it obscures the humanness
of black persons. We can more easily think of black persons as
not fully human so long as we do not see them in a familiar social
context. We can accept the absence of stigmatization in de jure
segregation, or its self-imposed quality, so long as we resist em-
pathy.14 As soon as we begin to imagine the actual circumstances
of black persons in nineteenth-century America and the pain and
humiliation of de jure segregation, the rhetoric of Brown's opinion
for the Court in Plessy starts to unravel.15 The great power of
black abstraction is its power to blunt the possible empathetic
response.
Black abstraction and white innocence worked together in the
legal rhetoric to obscure the degradation of blacks and to absolve
12. 163 U.S. 537, 544 (1895) ("Laws permitting, and even requiring, [black and white]
separation in places where they are liable to be brought into contact do not necessarily
imply the inferiority of either race to the other.
13. Id. at 551.
14. See Ross, The Richmond Narratives, 68 TEX. L. REv. 381, 409-13 (1989) (asserting the
power of narrative as a means of experiencing empathy).
15. With no opportunity to participate in the political decisions regarding their
own future, Negroes-even those who were college and university graduates-
were unable to intervene effectively at any point. They were compelled,
therefore, to accept decisions made for them by their former masters and the
other whites who were eligible to serve their states under the Lincoln and
Johnson plans of Reconstruction. Not only were Negroes without any voice in
the decisions about their future, but they were also without any protection
against the mistreatment or injustices to which they were subjected by the
decision-makers. They could and did protest the enactment of harsh black
codes by the state legislatures, but their protests were scarcely heard in the
state capitals or even in Washington.
A. WEINSTEIN & F. GATELL, THE SEGREGATION ERA, 1863-1954, at 47-48 (1970).
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the contemporary whites of responsibility for any images of deg-
radation that might have passed through the filter of black ab-
straction. Thus, these rhetorical themes made the choices of the
nineteenth-century judges intellectually coherent and smoothed
over the conflict between the reality of subjugation and the
abstract principles of freedom and equality.
Today, we discredit both the choices the Court made in Dred
Scott and the rhetoric that Taney constructed.16 The same can be
said of the Civil Rights Cases,'7 Plessy, and other nineteenth-century
cases on race.'8 Moreover, the rhetorical theme of white innocence
sounds tinny to our twentieth-century ears. How could those
judges have smoothed over the reality of responsibility and choice
in their actions? Similarly, the theme of black abstraction and its
denial or eclipse of the humanness of the black person are abhor-
rent to our contemporary notions of race.
Yet, the rhetorical themes of the nineteenth-century cases on
race are still the essential themes of our contemporary legal
rhetoric of race. In the contemporary legal rhetoric created by
those Justices who seek to limit efforts to undo the contemporary
reality of racial segregation and economic subjugation, we see the
insistence on white innocence and the abstract depiction of the
black person. 9 Although the precise rhetorical structures are
different, the central themes of white innocence and black abstrac-
tion run through the tapestry of our legal rhetoric of race, then
and now.
This paper focuses on the rhetoric of two sets of cases, a set
of legal choices we now discredit and our own choices. This focus
clarifies the arguments that constitute our legal discourse about
race. By this particular comparison of the two sets of rhetoric, we
can see that the themes and implicit premises of much of contem-
porary rhetoric bear a similarity to a rhetoric and a set of choices
we now disavow. This family resemblance ought to make us
rethink our rhetoric and thereby rethink our choices. If we can
see the implicit claim to innocence and begin to wonder about it,
if we can be more attentive to the real and rich social context in
16. See, e.g., L. TRIE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW S 16-21, at 1516 (2d ed. 1988).
Tribe refers to Taney's rhetoric as based on an "odious hierarchy." Id.
17. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
18. See Kaczorowski, The Enforcement Provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1866: A
Legislative History in Light of Runyon v. McCrary, 98 YALE L.J. 565 (1989) (contrasting the
restrictive interpretive mode of the Court in the Reconstruction cases with the expansive
interpretation to achieve the "obvious ends" of the Constitution in the fugitive slave cases).
19. See infra notes 91-129 and accompanying text.
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which our choices are played out, we may begin to push our legal
discourse of race past its current tragic state of impasse.
II. LEGAL RHETORIC OF RACISM IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
For many, the rhetoric supporting the institution of slavery was
constructed simply. Once one got past establishing the nonhuman
nature of blacks, the rest was easy. If the white person had any
moral obligation in the matter, that obligation was to use the
blacks to further the interests of society, a society from which
the black was excluded. The horrific conditions of slave existence
became the tokens of charity and benevolence to the black brute.
This particular rhetoric took various forms but always avoided
any real conflict in values and principles by placing the black
outside the community of humans. 21
The rhetoric of the nineteenth-century Justices seems at first
glance to be not at all like this form of virulent racism. Yet, their
rhetoric often worked in much the same manner, not explicitly
denying, but obscuring the humanness of the black as part of a
rhetoric dressed up in abstractions, syllogisms, and legal vernac-
ular. The abstract principles of individual freedom and human
equality, ideas that were at the core of Revolutionary and consti-
tutional discourse, ostensibly conflicted with the reality of slavery,
and later in the century, the reality of de jure segregation and
oppression of blacks. This ostensible conflict was the cracked
surface of reality which demanded the smoothing veneer of legal
rhetoric. Those judges who denied themselves the rhetorical move
of the most virulent form of racism, the move explicitly placing
blacks outside the human community, had to be more sophisticated
in their arguments. They had to construct a more subtle rhetorical
artifice, yet one that embodied its own version of racism.
The best of the rhetoricians constructed exquisitely horrific
rhetorical structures to justify choices that society has since dis-
credited. As examples, this paper analyzes the Court's opinions in
Dred Scott, the Civil Rights Cases, and Plessy.21 These cases, we
now say, form a tragic chapter in the Court's jurisprudence of
race.22 Woven through the Court's opinions in Dred Scott, the Civil
Rights Cases, and Plessy, the themes of white innocence and black
20. See ARROGANCE, supra note 8, at 15-27.
21. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883);
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
22. See supra notes 16 and 18.
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abstraction made intellectually coherent the subjugation of blacks.
This rhetoric did not create the conditions of subjugation. The
rhetoric, however, did dress up the choices which were, at the
least, not choices to mitigate that subjugation. In this sense, the
rhetoric was a symptom of the disease of racism that gripped the
legal culture, and the larger culture, of nineteenth-century Amer-
ica.
A. Dred Scott and Taney's Narrative of Subjugation
Chief Justice Taney's opinion in Dred Scott stained the Court's
history and virtually ruined the historical standing of its author.P
Nonetheless, it is a remarkable and revealing rhetorical structure.
Taney's opinion was infamous in his time mostly for its decla-
ration that Congress lacked the power to prohibit slavery in the
Territories, thus declaring the Missouri Compromise unconstitu-
tional.2 The opinion is infamous in our time for its assertion that
blacks were not citizens of the United States.2 To establish the
latter assertion, Taney's central rhetorical structure was the nar-
rative of subjugation. He told the story of the subjugation of
blacks through colonial times and into the constitutional period.26
Linking this narrative with an original intent interpretive theory,
he concluded that because the drafters of the Constitution could
not have imagined blacks as citizens, he was bound by their
intentions on the matter.2 '
Taney's narrative is remarkable in various ways. First, it poses
a challenge to one of the central points of this paper. I argue that
black abstraction was a central theme, that the rhetoricians typi-
cally portrayed the black outside of any real and rich social context.
Yet, Taney placed the black in a social context and purported to
tell the black person's story.
Taney's narrative of subjugation is a departure from black
abstraction, but in form only and, in all important respects, is
simply another way of arriving at the rhetorical end of black
23. The decision "wrecked the reputation of Chief Justice Taney; and it impaired the
prestige of the Court for years to come." W. LEWIS, WITHOUT FEAR OR FAVOR 423 (1965).
24. Id- at 425.
25. "The effect of Taney's statement [that the Negro had no rights that the white man
was bound to respect] was to place Negroes of the 1780s-even free Negroes-on the same
level, legally, as domestic animals. As 'historical narrative,' it was a gross perversion of
the facts." D. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE 349 (1978).
26. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 407-21 (1856).
27. Id. at 404-05.
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abstraction. The essential purpose of black abstraction is to deny,
or obscure, the humanness of the black person. Taney got to that
end by narrative, not abstraction.
Taney could make his narrative achieve his end because of the
inescapable ideology of any historical narrative. Taney made a
set of choices in the construction of his narrative. He chose not
simply what to tell out of the rich set of possibilities; he also
chose to place his narrative in a particular place and time and
then, from within that place and time, he chose what pieces of
that story to tell. Taney did not, for example, choose to place any
portion of his narrative of the black person in Africa, where the
black person was part of a real and rich culture. Taney chose not
to tell the story of seventeenth-century colonial life with its
relative tolerance for the black person.2 Moreover, in his con-
structed narrative, he found virtually no place for the story of the
free blacks living in the constitutional period.3
Taney's narrative of subjugation was neither lie nor fiction.
Blacks were subjugated in the various ways he chronicled. He
constructed his narrative, however, for a rhetorical end. Taney's
narrative thus demonstrated that the rhetoric of black abstraction,
like any rhetoric, can be put aside whenever the same rhetorical
ends can be achieved otherwise. Taney's narrative coupled with
his interpretive theory achieved perfectly the rhetorical ends of
white innocence and black abstraction. He argued that the nar-
rative demonstrated the pervasive subjugation of blacks preceding
the constitutional era. Thus, the Founding Fathers never could
have intended that this subjugated race would be citizens with
the same constitutional status as white persons. Under his pro-
fessed interpretive theory, these intentions concluded the matter.
28. See H. WHITE, METAHISTORY: THE HISTORICAL IMAGINATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY
EUROPE (1973); H. WHITE, TROPICS OF DISCOURSE: ESSAYS IN CULTURAL CRITICISM (1978).
29. See ARROGANCE, supra note 8, at 189-205. Professor Fredrickson explored the relative
tolerance in the 1600's and the transition to a "consistently racist society" beginning at the
end of the seventeenth century. Id at 198. Judge Higginbotham documented this transition
to a consistent and virulent racism in colonial America. A. HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE
MATTER OF COLOR: RACE AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS: THE COLONIAL PERIOD (1978).
30. No one of that race had ever migrated to the United States voluntarily; all
of them had been brought here as articles of merchandise. The number that
had been emancipated at that time were but few in comparison with those
held in slavery; and they were identified in the public mind with the race to
which they belonged, and regarded as a part of the slave population rather
than the free.
Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 411.
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The question before us is, whether the class of persons described
in the plea in abatement compose a- portion of this people, and
are constituent members of this sovereignty? We think they
are not, and that they are not included, and were not intended
to be included, under the word "citizens" in the Constitution
. . . . On the contrary, they were at that time considered as a
subordinate and inferior class of beings, who had been subju-
gated by the dominant race, and, whether emancipated or not,
yet remained subject to their authority, and had no rights or
privileges but such as those who held the power and the
Government might choose to grant them.
It is not the province of the court to decide upon the justice
or injustice, the policy or impolicy, of these laws. The decision
of that question belonged to the political or law-making power;
to those who formed the sovereignty and framed the Constitu-
tion. The duty of the court is, to interpret the instrument they
have framed, with the best lights we can obtain on the subject,
and to administer it as we find it, according to its true intent
and meaning when it was adopted.31
Thus, the constructed narrative and the interpretive theory formed
a complete rhetorical edifice. Blacks simply were not citizens. The
rhetoric made this appalling conclusion coherent.
Taney's narrative reduced blacks to an inferior, if not subhuman,
status, not just in history but in the moment. By telling his
particular story, Taney made an assertion about history. By using
the story to justify the conclusion that blacks could not be citizens,
Taney reinforced the "less than human" legal status of black
persons in his own time.
Taney's use of the original intent theory in this case also is
connected with the theme of white innocence. Although the original
intent interpretive theory is not unique to the Dred Scott case, its
use did permit Taney to push away responsibility for his choice.
Depending on the extent of Taney's racism, he may have felt little
need to evade personal responsibility for his choice.3 2 Nonetheless,
his originalism theory permitted him to pretend that he was not
saying blacks ought not be deemed citizens. He merely was saying
that the Constitution, properly interpreted, did not include them.
Whether a conscious evasion or not, Taney's theory is an example
31. Id. at 404-05.
32. "Pleading lack of time in the preparation of his Dred Scott opinion, he prepared a
voluminous supplement justifying his conclusions on the issue of Negro citizenship" W.
LEWIS, supra note 23, at 428.
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of the white man taking the position of nonculpability for the
circumstances of the black person.
In a more general sense, Taney's opinion suggested a natural-
ness to the subjugation of the blacks. In his rhetorical world,
blacks were unidimensional characters, everywhere and always
subjugated. This portrayal suggested that the subjugation was a
product of their natural difference as opposed to the brute force
of the white master race. This suggestion of naturalness or inev-
itability mitigated the dissonance between the reality of subjuga-
tion and the principles of freedom and equality.
B. The Civil Rights Cases and the "Special Favorites"
The Reconstruction Amendments3 negated the formal rhetoric
of Taney's opinion in Dred Scott. Legal rhetoric, at least in its
explicit premises, could not deny blacks the status of citizen.
Moreover, any originalism interpretive argument had to accom-
modate a new set of "Founding Fathers" who created their piece
of the Constitution at an importantly different moment in our
history.
The scope of the Reconstruction Amendments has been, from
their beginning, a controversial issue. 4 In the Civil Rights Cases,
the Court held that the first and second sections of the Civil
Rights Act of 1875, Congress's effort to provide some source of
statutory protection for the southern blacks in the waning days
of Reconstruction, were unconstitutional.35 Justice Bradley, writing
for the majority, concluded that neither the thirteenth nor the
fourteenth amendment gave Congress the power to enact a law
that prohibited racial discrimination in public accommodations and
conveyances.3 Bradley's opinion relied on the concept of "state
action" to limit the authority that the fourteenth amendment
granted to Congress. 7 The statute, he argued, regulated private
action. The fourteenth amendment did not reach such private
action.8 The thirteenth amendment did not authorize the federal
statute because racial segregation in public facilities was not
33. U.S. CONST. amends. XIH & XIV.
34. See Kennedy, Reconstruction and the Politics of Scholarship, 98 YALE L.J. 521 (1989).
35. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
36. Id. at 31-32.
37. Id. at 25.
38. Id. at 11.
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deemed a "badge" of slavery.39 In Bradley's words, "what has it
to do with the question of slavery?"40
Bradley's opinion contained perhaps the most outrageous ex-
ample of black abstraction in the nineteenth-century rhetoric:
When a man has emerged from slavery, and by the aid of
beneficent legislation has shaken off the inseparable concomi-
tants of that state, there must be some stage in the progress
of his elevation when he takes the rank of a mere citizen, and
ceases to be the special favorite of the laws, and when his rights
as a citizen, or a man, are to be protected in the ordinary modes
by which other men's rights are protected.41
Bradley's fantastic assertion is coherent only in the abstract. In
the abstract, the statute sought to create a protection especially
for black citizens. But this special treatment was the product of
the reality of pervasive oppression of blacks by whites. The
purpose of the federal statute struck down in the case was to
create the possibility of some continued federal presence and
power in the South to protect the blacks as Reconstruction came
to a close and the federal government began what became ulti-
mately an abandonment of the southern blacks.42 Thus, the statutes
especially protected black citizens. The whites of course were not
especially favored precisely because they were the oppressors.
Harlan, in dissent, responded to the "special favorites" argu-
ment:
It is, I submit, scarcely just to say that the colored race has
been the special favorite of the laws .... What the nation,
through Congress, has sought to accomplish in reference to that
race is-what had already been done in every State of the
Union for the white race-to secure and protect rights belonging
to them as freemen and citizens; nothing more .... The one
underlying purpose of congressional legislation has been to
39. Id at 21.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 25.
42. [Blacks in the Redeemers' New South found themselves enmeshed in a
seamless web of oppression, whose interwoven economic, political, and social
strands all reinforced one another. In illiteracy, malnutrition, inadequate hous-
ing, and a host of other burdens, blacks paid the highest price for the end of
Reconstruction and the stagnation of the Southern economy.
E. FONER, RECONSTRUCTION 598 (1988). Professor Randall Kennedy has written a thoughtful
review essay on Foner's book and Reconstruction as a piece of historical turf to which our
contemporary factions lay claim. Kennedy, supra note 34.
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enable the black race to take the rank of mere citizens. 43
Harlan's opinion, unlike Bradley's, reflected some sense of the
reality of nineteenth-century America, some sense of the actual
social context in which the statute would have operated.
Bradley's opinion also has an abstract quality in its assertion
that only the random acts of individuals victimized blacks and that
victimized blacks simply could get redress in the state courts.
The wrongful act of an individual, unsupported by any [state]
authority, is simply a private wrong, or a crime of that individ-
ual; an invasion of the rights of the injured party, it is true,
whether they affect his person, his property, or his reputation;
but if not sanctioned in some way by the State, or not done
under State authority, his rights remain in full force, and may
presumably be vindicated by resort to the laws of the State for
redress.44
Bradley's suggestion was disconnected from the reality of the
social context. The wrongs for which blacks might have sought
redress were rapidly becoming the official state policy.45 Redress
in the state courts was a fanciful illusion-except on the rhetorical
field of abstraction.
By keeping his rhetoric above the field of play and in the strata
of abstract assertions, Bradley thereby was able to make assertions
that were laughable in their real and operating context. He was
able to smooth over the dissonance in the Court's exercise of its
power to void a statute designed to address the real and pervasive
oppression of black citizens. In Bradley's rhetorical world, the Civil
War and the Reconstruction Amendments ended all forms of state-
sanctioned racial oppression. All that was left were the random
acts of individual lawbreakers. And the state courts, of course,
would redress those acts effectively.
Bradley's opinion also expressed the theme of white innocence.
He stressed the potential for the victimization of the innocent
43. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 61 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
44. Id. at 17.
45. T]he structure of segregation and discrimination was extended by the adoption
of a great number of the Jim Crow type laws .... The mushroom growth
of discriminatory and segregation laws during the first two decades of this
century piled up a huge bulk of legislation .... Much ingenuity went into
the separation of the races in their amusements, diversions, recreations, and
sports.
A. WEINSTEIN & F. GATELL, supra note 15, at 86-87.
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white race. He conjured the specter of some future municipal code
that would govern the private lives and choices of whites, com-
pelling them to accept black persons into their communities on
terms of equality. The federal statute "steps into the domain of
local jurisprudence, and lays down rules for the conduct of indi-
viduals in society towards each other, and imposes sanctions for
the enforcement of those rules.."46 This intrusion into the white
man's prerogatives was the true violation of rights at stake in the
case. White people were merely expressing preferences based on
a pervasively embraced ideology of racism. The Court guaranteed
to the whites their right to express and live out their racism.
Bradley's opinion at once obscured the degradation of blacks in
the aftermath of Reconstruction and implied the innocence of the
whites who were in fact responsible for this degradation. In
Bradley's rhetorical world: blacks must assume the responsibilities
of mere citizens and not seek special favor in the law; there is no
state-sanctioned racism, only the isolated private wrongs that are
not a source of guilt or responsibility for the white race; and,
perhaps most importantly, the Court must protect innocent whites
from the victimization of forced integration.47
C. Plessy and the Self-Imposed Stigma
In Plessy v. Ferguson,4 the Court reviewed a Louisiana statute
that segregated railroad passengers by race, a statute that ex-
emplified the proliferating new "Black Codes" which established
de jure segregation throughout the South in the late nineteenth
century.49 Justice Brown spoke for the majority of the Court and
held the statute constitutional. That the segregation law posed no
thirteenth amendment problem was "too clear for argument." ° He
reduced the fourteenth amendment conflict to the question whether
the statute was a "reasonable regulation," a question that implied
the extension of "a large discretion" to the legislature.51 Brown
found the statute to be reasonable in its connection with "estab-
46. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 14.
47. Contemporary debate about affirmative action contains echoes of Bradley's arguments.
Rhetoricians who oppose affirmative action often assert that affirmative action is a form of
legal favoritism based on race, that racism is essentially a thing of the past, and that
affirmative action victimizes innocent whites. See Ross, supra note 1, at 298.
48. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
49. Id
50. Id. at 542.
51. Id. at 550.
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lished usages, customs, and traditions of the people, and with a
view to the promotion of their comfort, and the preservation of
the public peace and good order. '52
The only problem with the reasonableness of the law was that
the law was grounded in its sanction of racism. The "traditions"
were those of racism; the "comfort" was that experienced by
whites who were legally protected from the physical proximity of
blacks; and the threat to "public peace" was the specter of whites
reacting violently to the efforts of blacks to take a place of social
equality. Both the law itself and the reasons for the law that
Brown advanced were expressions of the pervasive and especially
virulent racism that gripped this country in the latter nineteenth
century.-
Nonetheless, the legal rhetoric of Brown's opinion in Plessy
made the choice somehow intellectually coherent. Brown built his
opinion on the assertion that segregation by law does not degrade
or stigmatize the black person. "Laws permitting, and even re-
quiring, [racial segregation] in places where they are liable to be
brought into contact do not necessarily imply the inferiority of
either race to the other . . ."54 Moreover, Brown asserted that
any sense of stigma felt by a black person would be self-imposed:
We consider the underlying fallacy of plaintiffs argument to
consist in the assumption that the enforced separation of the
two races stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority.
If this be so, it is not by reason of anything found in the act,
but solely because the colored race chooses to put that construc-
tion upon it.5s
52. Id.
53. See BLACK IMAGE, supra note 7, at 256-82.
54. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 544. The brief for the segregationist position also expressed the
formal equality of the statute:
[A]ny passenger insisting on going into a coach or compartment to which, by
race, he does not belong, shall be liable to be punished according to its
provisions. Should a white passenger insist on going into a coach or compart-
ment to which by race he does not belong, he would thereby render himself
liable to punishment according to this law. There is, therefore, no distinction
or unjust discrimination in this respect on account of color.
Brief on Behalf of Defendant in Error at 14-15, Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896),
reprinted in 13 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES 95-96 (1975) [hereinafter LANDMARK BRIEFS] (Brief of M.J. Cunningham, Attorney
General of Louisiana).
55. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 551. The Louisiana Supreme Court made this self-imposed stigma
argument and incorporated it in the brief filed by the Attorney General of Louisiana:
We have been at pains to expound this statute because the dissatisfaction
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These assertions seem patent nonsense to us now. And they
were just as patently nonsensical in Brown's time and place. The
purpose and effect of the racial segregation laws throughout our
legal history always have been the same-to express the racial
inferiority of the blacks. These laws were a product of, and an
expression of, racism, then and later. When a black person subject
to laws commanding racial segregation in railroad cars felt thereby
a sense of stigma, she had not misunderstood the message, she
had not revealed some idiosyncratic sensitivity; rather, she had
heard and received the message sent by those responsible for the
law.
Only in some abstract conception of the society could one say,
with a straight face, that these segregation laws were not premised
on racism and did not express a message of racial inferiority. Only
in this abstract conception could the argument of equal treatment
of each race under the law have any real power. Any real attempt
felt with it by a portion of the people seems to us so unreasonable that we
can account for it only on the ground of some misconception. Even were it
true that the statute is prompted by a prejudice on the part of one race to
be thrown in such contact with the other; one would suppose that to be a
sufficient reason why the pride and self-respect of the other race should equally
prompt it to avoid such contact if it could be done without the sacrifice of
equal accommodations.
Brief on Behalf of Defendant in Error at 51-52, Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896),
reprinted in 13 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 54, at 131 (Brief of M.J. Cunningham, Attorney
General of Louisiana).
The lawyers for Plessy tried to return the argument to the plane of reality:
Perhaps it might not be inappropriate to suggest some questions which may
aid in deciding this inquiry. How much would it be worth to a young man
entering upon the practice of law, to be regarded as a white man rather than
a colored one? Six-sevenths of the population are white. Nineteen-twentieths
of the property of the country is owned by white people. Ninety-nine hun-
dredths of the business opportunities are in the control of white people. These
propositions are rendered even more startling by the intensity of feeling which
excludes the colored man from the friendship and companionship of the white
man. Probably most white persons if given a choice, would prefer death to
life in the United States as colored persons.
Brief for Plaintiff in Error at 9, Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), reprinted in 13
LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 54, at 27, 36 (Brief of James C. Walker). Plessy's lawyers
also coined a particularly apt phrase to describe the stigmatizing message of the laws:
[T]he discrimination in question is along the line of the late institution of
slavery, and is a distinct disparagement of those persons who thereby are
statutorily separated from others because of a Color which a few years before,
with so small exception, had placed them within that line. It therefore amounts
to a taunt by law of that previous condition of their class-a taunt by the
State, to be administered with perpetually repeated like taunts in word by
railroad employ6s, in places of public business resort within Louisiana.
Brief for Plaintiff in Error at 7-8, Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), reprinted in 13
LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 54, at 10-11 (Brief of S.F. Phillips and F.D. McKenney).
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actually to imagine the motivation for the passage of these laws
and the effect the laws would have on black citizens unravels
Brown's argument.
At several points in the opinion, Brown did leave the rhetorical
field of black abstraction and demonstrate the reality of racism.
Specifically, he did so through the expression of his own racism,
which was part of the public and widely shared ideology of his
time. Brown argued that if a state legislature dominated by blacks
passed a racial segregation law like the one challenged in Plessy,
the white race would not assume it was an expression of the
inferiority of the white race. Here, Brown stepped out of the
realm of abstraction and made a sensible comment on the society
in which he lived. Brown's society was an essentially racist society
in which the very notion of a white man thinking himself inferior
to a black man on account of race was lunatic.57
Brown revealed again his sense of the real society within which
these laws operated in his concluding passage. Brown referred to
the inherent problem in the implementation of a racial segregation
law; that is, the problem of defining a "white" person. Brown
noted that a statutorily specified blood ratio typically resolved
this definitional problem. The state statutes on this subject dif-
fered. In some states, "the predominance of white blood must only
be in the proportion of three fourths." In other states, "any
visible admixture of black blood stamp[ed] the person as belonging
to the colored race."59 These laws defining the status of being
white were patently racist. The conception of "tainted black blood"
is obvious when the spectrum of white ranges from "only . . .
three fourths" white blood to the absence of any "visible admix-
ture."
Brown's opinion also embodied the theme of white innocence.
The self-imposed stigma argument permitted the white to evade
responsibility for any degradation felt by the black person. More-
over, the racism expressed explicitly and implicitly throughout the
opinion gave a naturalness and logic to the de jure segregation
which, in turn, let the white person off the hook. Blacks were
different and inferior. Thus, the segregation of blacks was natural
and not an act of oppression.
56. "We imagine that the white race, at least, would not acquiesce in this assumption"
Pessy, 163 U.S. at 551.
57. See BLACK IMAGE, supra note 7, at 187-88.
58. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 552.
59. Id.
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By considering the circumstances of the black person in an
abstract context and by asserting the natural inferiority of the
black race, Brown's opinion rhetorically mitigated any possible
conflict between the declared constitutionality of de jure segre-
gation and the ostensible constitutional principle of equality. Thus,
in Plessy, as in Dred Scott and the Civil Rights Cases, rhetoric
embodying the themes of black abstraction and white innocence
helped smooth over the cracked surface of the tragic reality of
the Court's response to the enslavement and degradation of blacks
in nineteenth-century America.
III. THE CONTEMPORARY RHETORIC OF RACE
We have our own cracked surface of tragic reality. Prior to
Brown v. Board of Education,w our tragedy was the continuing
presence of de jure segregation and all that it entailed. Post-
Brown, the tragedy is different but nonetheless powerful. Black
people constitute a disproportionate percentage of the poor.61 Seg-
regation has shifted from de jure to de facto 2 The efforts to use
constitutional principles and federal courts to desegregate our
society have not worked and our courts seem to be withdrawing
from the struggle.P
As we walk away from the contemporary reality of economic
deprivation and segregation of blacks, we run into the conflict it
poses. In a society committed to racial equality, in a society in
which racism is no longer part of the official ideology nor part of
accepted political and legal discourse, how are we to account for
60. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
61. "Among whites, 11.4 percent of all persons were poor compared to 31.3 percent
among blacks and 29 percent among Hispanics." M. KATz, THE UNDESERVING POOR 241
(1989). These figures were computed as of 1985 and gauged poverty after taking account
of various government transfer programs such as Aid to Families with Dependent Children.
As of 1982, the median income of all black families was only 55.3% of the median income
figure for white families. See THE QUESTION OF DIsCRMINATION: RACIAL INEQUALITY IN THE
U.S. LABOR MARKET 58, Table 3.3 (S. Shulman & W. Darity, Jr. eds. 1989). See generally R.
FARLEY & W. ALLEN, THE COLOR LINE AND THE QUALITY OF LIFE IN AMERICA (1987).
62. See Massey & Denton, Suburbanization and Segregation in U.S. Metropolitan Areas,
94 Ate. J. Soc. 592 (1988). But cf McKinney & Schnare, Trends in Residential Segregation
by Race: 1960-1980, 26 J. Uan. ECoN. 269, 278 (1988) ("Segregation was lower in 1980 than
it was in 1960."). For a thoughtful analysis of the impact of residential segregation on legal
efforts to integrate the public schools, see Farley, Residential Segregation and Its Implications
for School Integration, 39 LAw & CONTEMP. PROSS. 164 (1975).
63. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, supra note 16, § 16-19, at 1493-1501 (chronicling the Court's retreat
from school desegregation). See generally We the People: A Celebration of the Bicentennial of
the United States Constitution, 30 How. L.J. 623 (1987).
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the separation and apparent subjugation of black citizens? More-
over, as the Court retreats from the effort to bring about change,
the conflict seems even more pressing. Still, we go on as though
economic deprivation and segregation of blacks somehow makes
sense.
Our ability to make intellectually coherent and tolerable this
apparent conflict is largely a product of a rhetoric much like the
legal rhetoric of the nineteenth century. Like the earlier rhetoric,
our version helps smooth over the apparent inconsistency between
our realities and our principles. Our rhetoric also expresses our
version of the themes of white innocence and black abstraction.
At one time, we might have supposed that we would not have
had to face such a conflict in the late twentieth century. That
time was the moment of Brown v. Board of Education.P Brown
changed much and held the promise of more. Yet, one can see in
Brown both the promise and the specter of what was to come by
discerning both the change and the continuity in the rhetoric of
race.
A. The Promise of Brown
Brown v. Board of Education was a moment of transition. It
dramatically changed constitutional law. It set off a firestorm of
controversy about the institutional role of the Court, which is still
raging today.6 5 In important ways, nothing could ever be the same
after Brown.
The case was also a moment of transition in the legal language
and rhetoric of race. The advocates for racial segregation brought
to the Court a rhetoric that advanced the following propositions:
(i) segregation did not harm blacks (if anything, blacks were its
beneficiaries); (ii) whites had no reason to apologize or feel ashamed;
and (iii) the felt need of whites for segregation ought to be re-
spected and, if integration were to come, it must be done with
careful attention to the potential harm to whites.66
64. 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BRoWN v. BOARD
OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (1976).
65. See R. BERGER, supra note 10; Addresses Construing the Constitution, 19 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 1-30 (1985) (essays by Justices Brennan and Stevens and by Edwin Meese, III);
Black, The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421 (1960); Soifer, Review
Essay-Protecting Civil Rights: A Critique of Raoul Berger's History, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 651
(1979); Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959).
66. See infra notes 67-71 and accompanying text.
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The legal champions of segregation brought their versions of
white innocence and black abstraction to the debate. The Attorney
General of Virginia, J. Lindsay Almond, argued:
They are asking you to disturb the unfolding evolutionary
process of education where from the dark days of the depraved
institution of slavery, with the help and the sympathy and the
love and the respect of the white people of the South, the
colored man has risen under that educational process to a place
of eminence and respect throughout this nation. It has served
him well.67
From North Carolina came I. Beverly Lake, arguing:
I speak on behalf of a State which is conscious of no wrong-
doing in this matter. North Carolina is proud of her record in
the field of Negro education. Today North Carolina is, in fact,
educating more Negro children than any other state in the
Union. And she is educating them well.68
His Texas counterpart, John Ben Shepperd, repeated the theme
of paternalism and the moral virtue of the segregationist:
There is no discrimination on the part of the State of Texas
in administering its public school system, only separation of the
races. It is the belief of the people of this State that discrimi-
nation against the individual can best be eliminated by segre-
gation of the races in the educational system. It is the evil of
discrimination and not segregation per se that is condemned by
the United States Constitution.6 9
Shepperd pleaded for the Court's sensitivity to "the individual
rights, mores and beliefs of the Southern people."70 And he closed
with a threat:
67. Transcript of Oral Argument at 11, Davis v. County School Bd. of Prince Edward
County, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), reprinted in 49A LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 54, at 512
(Argument of J. Lindsay Almond on Behalf of Appellees).
68. Transcript of Oral Argument at 69, Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954),
reprinted in 49A LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 54, at 1211 (Argument of I. Beverly Lake
on Behalf of the State of North Carolina as the Friend of the Court).
69. Brief of John Ben Shepperd, Attorney General of Texas, Amicus Curiae at 3-4, Brown
v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), reprinted in 49A LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 54,
at 1044-45.
70. Id. at 5, reprinted in 49A LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 54, at 1046.
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Compulsion can only arouse resentment, individual discrimina-
tion, and, as experience has demonstrated in other states, vio-
lence. The objectives reached by the War between the States
left a scar of bitterness and resentment that is visible even now
in some parts of the South. Such, we hope, will not be the result
of this Court's May 17th decision.71
Each of these men expressed the rhetorical themes of the inno-
cence of the white and the absence of harm to the black.
The segregationists also were adamant in their denial of any
racist motives. The lawyer for North Carolina spoke of the mys-
terious nonracist phenomenon, "race consciousness":
[E]verybody in North Carolina - practically everybody in North
Carolina-is either Anglo-Saxon or Negro. As a result of that,
we have more consciousness of race in North Carolina than is
to be found in some of the border and northern states. That
race consciousness is not race prejudice. It is not race hatred.
It is not intolerance. It is a deeply ingrained awareness of a
birthright held in trust for posterity.72
The Texas Attorney General assured the Court: "Texas loves its
Negro people and Texas will solve their problems its own way."73
The star of the segregationist advocates was John W. Davis.74
The Justices listened with virtually no interruptions to his oral
argument as he defended the constitutionality of racial segregation
in the public schools. Davis too expressed the themes of the
absence of racism and the absence of any harm to the blacks. He
argued, with an elegant brutality:
You say that [segregation is a product of] racism. Well, it is
not racism. Recognize that for sixty centuries and more human-
ity has been discussing questions of race and race tension, not
racism. Say that we make special provisions for the aboriginal
Indian population of this country; it is not racism. Say that 29
states have miscegenation statutes now in force which they
believe are of beneficial protection to both races. Disraeli said,
71. Id.
72. Transcript of Oral Argument at 13-14, Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954),
reprinted in 49A LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 54, at 1227-28.
73. Transcript of Oral Argument at 56, Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954),
reprinted in 49A LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 54, at 1270 (Argument of Attorney General
John Ben Shepperd on Behalf of the State of Texas as the Friend of the Court).
74. See generally W. HARBAUGH, LAWYER'S LAWYER: THE LIFE OF JOHN W. DAvIS (1973).
[Vol. 32:1
THE RHETORICAL TAPESTRY OF RACE
"No man," said he, "will treat with indifference the principle of
race. It is the key of history."7 5
Davis concluded his oral argument thus:
Let me say this for the State of South Carolina. . . . It is
confident of its good faith and intention to produce equality for
all of its children of whatever race or color. It is convinced that
the happiness, the progress and the welfare of these children is
best promoted in segregated schools, and it thinks it a thousand
pities that by this controversy there should be urged the return
to an experiment which gives no more promise of success today
than when it was written into their Constitution during what I
call the tragic era.76
Davis's rhetoric, and the rhetoric of the other segregationist
lawyers, expressed a form of white innocence and black abstrac-
tion. The segregationist rhetoricians insisted on the absence of
racism as a motive. Blacks were not harmed. The only victims on
the horizon were the whites who might be compelled to give up
a way of life, without good reason. Only an abstract depiction of
the context could advance this benign picture of school segregation.
To say that racism was absent from the explanation for the
segregation laws made no sense once one considered the laws in
any real social and historical context. To assert that segregation
did not harm blacks seemed ludicrous when one imagined the
history of separate but unequal education.77 The entire rhetorical
structure tumbled with the embrace of even so simple an imagining
as the feelings and circumstances of black children being bussed
many miles across Texas to the black school, passing along the
way the schools for white children.78
75. Transcript of Oral Argument at 43, Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954),
reprinted in 49A LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 54, at 491 (Argument of John W. Davis on
Behalf of Appellees).
76. Id. at 44, reprinted in 49A LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 54, at 492.
77. See generally C. WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JZ1 CROW (3d ed. 1974).
78. Of the two hundred and thirteen Texas counties listing Negro scholastics, one
hundred forty-six counties offer a complete Negro high school, twenty-one
counties offer some Negro high school, but not twelve grades, and thirty-six
counties offer only Negro elementary school. Ten counties operate no school
for Negroes; however, these counties have ten or fewer Negro scholastics.
Negro scholastics in counties not having a complete twelve grades are trans-
ported at State expense to other schools.
Brief of John Ben Shepperd, Attorney General of Texas, Amicus Curiae at 8, Brown v.
Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), reprinted in 49A LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 54, at
1049.
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The most eloquent response to the segregationist rhetoric was
that of Thurgood Marshall. Marshall spoke thus:
They can't take race out of this case.
• ..[T]he only way that this Court can decide this case in
opposition to our position is that there must be some reason
which gives the state the right to make a classification . . . and
we submit the only way to arrive at this decision is to find that
for some reason Negroes are inferior to all other human beings.
• ..The only [explanation] is an inherent determination that
the people who were formerly in slavery, regardless of anything
else, shall be kept as near that stage as is possible; and now is
the time, we submit, that this Court should make it clear that
that is not what our Constitution stands for.79
Marshall insisted that segregation was by its nature an expression
of racial inferiority and a product of just such racist motives. He
denied the innocence of the white segregationist and argued the
palpable harm to the stigmatized black person. Marshall knew
well the rhetorical themes of white innocence and black abstraction
and met them-head on.
The Court decided the Brown case in two stages: first, the
declaration of the unconstitutionality of segregated public schools
in the Brown I opinion;80 and, second, the adoption of the "with
all deliberate speed" remedy in the Brown I1 opinion 8 ' In the
Brown I opinion, the Court resisted the rhetoric of black abstrac-
tion. "To separate [school children] from others of similar age and
qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of
inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect
their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone."8 2
This move represented the promise of a change in the rhetoric of
race that paralleled the promised change in constitutional law in
Brown L
The other important feature of the rhetoric of Brown I was the
Court's treatment of the rhetorical theme of white innocence. The
segregationist rhetoricians had expressed this theme in their in-
sistence on the absence of racism. On this issue, the Brown I
79. Transcript of Oral Argument at 21-22, Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954),
reprinted in 49A LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 54, at 522-23 (Rebuttal Argument of
Thurgood Marshall on Behalf of Appellants).
80. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) [hereinafter Brown 1].
81. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) [hereinafter Brown I].
82. Brown I, 347 U.S. at 494.
[Vol. 32:1
THE RHETORICAL TAPESTRY OF RACE
opinion offered a howling silence.83 The Court spoke not at all of
the racist motives for segregation. This silence thus left standing
the segregationists' insistence on white innocence.
This silence is important to an understanding of the history of
the rhetoric of race.84 The point is not that the Court erred in
failing to reject explicitly the formal assumption of white inno-
cence. The cost of an explicit charge of racist motives would have
been at least the loss of unanimity in the Brown decision. The
important observation is that the price of unanimity was, in effect,
the preservation of the rhetoric of white innocence. In this sense,
Brown I was both a moment of transition and a moment of
continuity in our rhetoric of race. Black abstraction was rejected;
white innocence was left intact.
We cannot know what would have been different had the Court
explicitly rejected white innocence. We can see, however, the
significance of the choice not to do so in the Court's choice of
remedy in Brown IL.85
Having concluded that segregated schools violated the consti-
tutional rights of black families, the Court had to decide what to
do about it. On the issue of remedy, Thurgood Marshall's position
was simple and powerful. Beyond any delay necessary to put the
machinery of desegregation into effect, he granted no basis for
further delay. Having found that segregated schools violated the
constitutional rights of black families, the Court had the duty to
remedy that violation.w
In Brown II, the Court rejected Marshall's simple analysis and
adopted the "with all deliberate speed" remedy.8 Again, there
were powerful pragmatic arguments for the delay in implemen-
83. "[Tjhe venial fault of the opinion [in Brown] consists in its not spelling out that
segregation . . . is perceptibly a means of ghettoizing the imputedly inferior race ....
That such treatment is generally not good for children needs less talk than the Court gives
it." Black, supra note 65, at 430 n.25.
84. "The draft, wrote the Chief, was 'prepared on the theory that the opinions should
be short, readable by the lay public, non-rhetorical, unemotional and, above all, non-
accusatory.'" B. SCMVARTZ, SUPER CHIEF 97 (1983).
85. Bro= II, 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
86. Brief for Appellants in Nos. 1, 2, and 3 and for Respondents in No. 5 on Further
Reargument at 11-16, Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955), reprinted in 49A,
LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 54, at 647.
87. The judgments below, except that in the Delaware case, are accordingly
reversed and the cases are remanded to the District Courts to take such
proceedings and enter such orders and decrees consistent with this opinion as
are necessary and proper to admit to public schools on a racially nondiscrim-
inatory basis with all deliberate speed the parties to these cases.
Brown II, 349 U.S. at 301.
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tation. Yet, whether right or wrong, the implicit backdrop of white
innocence made the delay in implementation intellectually and
socially tolerable. Had the Court in Brown I spoken of the racism
that motivated the segregation laws, the delay in Brown II would
have been more difficult to justify. To permit some period of time
for families to adjust to a new way of life is one thing; to permit
racists a period of continued expression of their racism out of fear
of their resistance and lawlessness is another thing.
Nonetheless, Brown could have been understood in its time as
a moment of transition in both the law and rhetoric of race. As
with all periods of important transition, society must give up some
things and yet, at the same time, hold on to some of the past.
White innocence as a rhetorical theme might have been a piece
of the past, kept in Brown but soon to fade away.
B. Contemporary Rhetoric of Race
An analysis of the rhetoric of our contemporary cases on race
reveals that the rhetorical promise of Brown was as incompletely
fulfilled as its promise of change in law and society. Thirty-six
years after Brown, we live in an essentially segregated society;
our current law provides no real basis for change; and the rhetoric
of race looks more and more like its nineteenth-century counter-
part.
To support the last of these sad conclusions, this paper analyzes
three contemporary cases: Milliken v. Bradley;m City of Memphis
v. Greene;9 and City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.90 These cases
span the past twenty-five years and each is an important chapter
in the story of race and the Constitution. These cases reveal in
especially powerful ways the contemporary legal rhetoric of race.
1. Milliken and the End of the Promise of Brown
In Milliken, the Court faced the difficult, but easily anticipated,
question whether the Constitution empowered the federal courts
to order interdistrict bussing to achieve racial integration in the
public schools. The emerging pattern in metropolitan areas of
black city schools and white suburban schools made the question
easily anticipated. The apparent necessity of interdistrict bussing
88. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
89. 451 U.S. 100 (1981).
90. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
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as the only workable remedy, coupled with the typical absence of
overt racial discrimination within the suburban school districts,
made the question difficult. A majority of the Court, in an opinion
written by Chief Justice Burger, concluded that the remedy was
virtually unavailable. 91
Milliken thus represented the end of the promise of Brown for
public school integration. Once Milliken functionally took away
from the federal courts the power to order interdistrict bussing
to implement desegregation, the common pattern of de facto
housing segregation in most parts of this country assured de facto
segregation in the schools. 92
A central part of Burger's rhetorical structure was the "per-
petrator perspective" built in Part II of his opinion.93 The perpe-
trator perspective was a search for perpetrators of racial
discrimination. 94 This search became a means of limiting the reach
of the law-the remedy was limited to reach only proven perpe-
trators. Burger concluded that the suburban school districts were
not perpetrators. The suburban school districts had not committed
a racially discriminatory act; they had simply provided public
education to the people who lived within their community, people
who happened to be virtually all white. In Burger's words:
[There was] no showing of significant violation by the 53 outlying
school districts and no evidence of any interdistrict viola-
tion .... To approve the remedy ordered by the court would
impose on the outlying districts, not shown to have committed
any constitutional violation, a wholly impermissible remedy based
on a standard not hinted at in Brown I and II or any holding
of this Court.95
91. "Most unfortunate of all is the Court's unwillingness even to consider-let alone to
counteract-the role of government agencies other than school boards in promoting and
perpetuating the residential segregation that will inevitably undermine the effort to elimi-
nate racial isolation in the public schools." L. TRIBE, supra note 16, §§ 16-19, at 1500; see
Farley, supra note 62.
92. Millikm 418 U.S. at 744-45, 757. See generally P. DIMOND, BEYOND BUSING: INSIDE THE
CHALLENGE TO URBAN SEGREGATION 110-18 (1985); E. WOLF, TRIAL AND ERROR: THE DETROIT
SCHOOL SEGREGATION CASE 23-80 (1981).
93. Milliken, 418 U.S. at 73747.
94. See Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A
Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049, 1052-57 (1978) (criticizing
the perpetrator perspective); Ross, supra note 1, at 299-308 (discussing the power and
danger of the "rhetoric of innocence" in affirmative action); Sullivan, The Supreme Court,
1985 Term-Comment: Sins of Discrimination: Last Term's Affirmative Action Cases, 100
HARV. L. REV. 78, 91-98 (1986) (criticizing the sin-based paradigm of affirmative action).
95. Milliken, 418 U.S. at 745.
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This perpetrator perspective is a manifestation of both white
innocence and black abstraction. The reality of the Milliken case,
which even Burger acknowledged, was the existence of a virtually
all black metropolitan school system and a virtually all white
suburban school system in Detroit.9 6 Burger insisted that this was
not something for which the suburban whites bore any responsi-
bility. Thus, to impose the remedy of bussing on the suburban
whites would be a victimization of innocents.
A rhetorical movement to an abstract conception of the two
school systems makes plausible this assertion of white innocence.
Burger did not discuss the real social context in which the case
arose and the social phenomena that accounted for the de facto
segregation.9 7 More particularly, he refused to address the phe-
nomenon of "white flight." When Detroit dismantled its dual,
segregated city school system, the white citizens of the city began
leaving for the suburbs. White families moving to the Detroit
metropolitan area clustered in the white suburbs. The suburban
schools became white, the city schools black, not by happenstance
but through a complex set of private and public choices 8 Burger's
rhetorical structure obscured the reality of white flight, thereby
suggesting that the segregation of the suburban school districts
was serendipitous or somehow mysterious. This rhetorical move
preserved the nonperpetrator status of the suburban school dis-
tricts. It also raised doubts about the victim status of the black
school children locked into the segregated city school system.
After all, if this pattern of segregation just happened, no one is
to blame and no one is a victim.
When one acknowledges the phenomenon of white flight as the
central part of the explanation of the existence of the all-white
suburban schools, the matter of innocence and victimization be-
comes more complex. White flight does not automatically make all
whites guilty, nor does it establish the victimization of the black
96. Id. at 726-27.
97. "[W]ithin many-but not all-metropolitan areas, the out-migration of a substantial
proportion of white families of childbearing age is responsible in large part for the existence
of central cities with large black populations and surrounding suburban rings with primarily
white populations." Farley, supra note 62, at 191. Burger considered such matters irrelevant:
"The dissents also seem to attach importance to the metropolitan character of Detroit and
neighboring school districts. But the constitutional principles applicable in school desegre-
gation cases cannot vary in accordance with the size or population dispersal of the particular
city, county, or school district as compared with neighboring areas." Milliken, 418 U.S. at
748 n.22.
98. See Farley, supra note 62, at 191; see also Milliken, 418 U.S. at 804-05 (1974) (Marshall,
J., dissenting) (predicting the possibility of white flight).
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children. It does suggest, however, that the perpetrator perspec-
tive operates at a level of abstraction which obscures the com-
plexity of de facto school segregation.
Burger's opinion thus offered a contemporary example of white
innocence and black abstraction. Burger's rhetorical move, to ig-
nore or obscure the real social context in which these stories are
played out, is similar to the black abstraction in Plessy and the
Civil Rights Cases. Both the nineteenth-century abstraction and
the contemporary version in Milliken are alike in their refusal to
depict the black person as a fully-rounded human living in a real
and vividly described social context.
A tragic irony is that the Court in Milliken undid the promise
of Brown through an opinion whose central rhetorical piece was
the refusal to speak of the obvious racism present in the social
context. As Warren's opinion in Brown did not speak of the racism
at work in de jure segregation of the public schools, Burger's
opinion in Milliken did not speak of the racism at work in de facto
segregation of the public schools. The silence in Brown was pre-
sumably the price of unanimity. Milliken may suggest that society
paid a special price for that particular silence, the price of leaving
intact for Burger and others the powerful rhetoric of white inno-
cence.
2. Greene and the Wall
In City of Memphis v. Greene,99 a majority of the Court concluded
that the city's decision to erect a traffic barrier that separated a
white neighborhood from a black neighborhood was neither a
violation of the thirteenth amendment nor a violation of section
1982 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.100 Scholars generally do not
deem Greene to be an important case. 10' Perhaps the fact that the
Court did not decide it on equal protection grounds made this
case seem marginal to some. Nonetheless, just as the traffic barrier
took on symbolic dimensions to the black plaintiffs, the Greene
99. 451 U.S. 100 (1981).
100. Id. at 129. Section 1982 establishes equal rights of all citizens to inherit, purchase,
lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1990).
101. Several of the standard constitutional law casebooks treat Greene only as a note
case rather than as a main case. See, e.g., E. BARRET, JR., W. COHEN & J. VARAT,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (8th ed. 1989); W. LOCKHART, Y. KAMISAR, J. CHOPER & S. SHIFFRIN,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (6th ed. 1986); R. ROTUNDA, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (3d ed.
1989). But see L. TRIBE, supra note 16; Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:
Reckoning With Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 357 (1987).
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decision, understood as constitutionally sanctioning the state's
construction of a "wall" separating a white neighborhood from a
black one, is a symbolically powerful chapter in the Court's juris-
prudence.
The plaintiffs in Greene brought their action under section 1982
and the thirteenth amendment, presumably hoping to avoid the
burden of proving discriminatory intent that the Court grafted on
to the equal protection clause in Washington v. Davis.102 The Court
in Greene formally evaded the discriminatory intent issue by
concluding that (i) the plaintiffs had no cognizable "property" in-
terest under section 1982103 and (ii) one could not sensibly char-
acterize the street closing as a badge of slavery under the thirteenth
amendment.10 4
Notwithstanding the Court's formal finesse of the discriminatory
intent issue, Justice Stevens devoted the bulk of his majority
opinion to a characterization of the street closing as the product
of a concern for safety and traffic and not an act based on any
notions of racism. 10 5 After an extended discourse on the factual
context, Stevens summarized the "critical facts" thus:
The city's decision to close West Drive was motivated by its
interest in protecting the safety and tranquility of a residential
neighborhood. The procedures followed in making the decision
were fair and were not affected by any racial or other imper-
missible factors. The city has conferred a benefit on certain
white property owners but there is no reason to believe that it
would refuse to confer a comparable benefit on black property
owners. The closing has not affected the value of property owned
by black citizens, but it has caused some slight inconvenience
to black motorists.1 6
Stevens concluded that there was "no basis for concluding that
the interests favored by the city in its decision were contrived or
pretextual."''o
The rhetoric of Stevens' opinion is a striking combination of
abstraction and innocence. Stevens argued that factors not related
to race motivated the street closing and thus, in effect, no per-
102. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
103. Greene, 451 U.S. at 123-24.
104. Id. at 126.
105. Id. at 111-19.
106. Id. at 119-20.
107. Id. at 128.
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petrators existed.'08 The absence of perpetrators was a claim to
innocence that was made possible, yet again, by the refusal to
place the case in any real and vivid social context. Stevens was
able to accept self-serving assertions by Memphis city officials of
concern for excessive traffic precisely because he had moved the
rhetorical field to some abstract place where racism was presumed
absent unless spoken bluntly.
The alternative summary of the facts in Justice Marshall's
dissent reveals the black abstraction at work in Stevens' opinion.
Marshall placed the case in its concrete context- Memphis, Ten-
nessee, a city with "a very real history of racial segregation - a
history that has in the past led to intercession by [the] Court."10 9
Marshall offered this different version of the "critical facts":
First, as the District Court found, Hein Park (the white neigh-
borhood protected by the traffic barrier) "was developed well
before World War II as an exclusive residential neighborhood
for white citizens and these characteristics have been main-
tained." Second, the area to the north of Hein Park, like the
"undesirable traffic" that Hein Park wants to keep out, is
predominantly Negro. And third, the closing of West Drive
stems entirely from the efforts of residents of Hein Park."0
These facts, "combined with a dab of common-sense," revealed to
Marshall the racism at work in the Greene case."'
The Greene case contains yet another echo of the nineteenth-
century rhetoric. Stevens concluded with a civics lesson on the
burdens of citizenship, directed at the black residents of Memphis:
Because urban neighborhoods are so frequently characterized
by a common ethnic or racial heritage, a regulation's adverse
impact on a particular neighborhood will often have a disparate
effect on an identifiable ethnic or racial group. To regard an
inevitable consequence of that kind as a form of stigma so
severe as to violate the Thirteenth Amendment would trivialize
the great purpose of that charter of freedom. Proper respect
for the dignity of the residents of any neighborhood requires
that they accept the same burdens as well as the same benefits
108. Id. at 110-29.
109. Id. at 14344 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 138 Marshall, J., dissenting).
111. "But the evidence in this case, combined with a dab of common-sense, paints a far
different picture from the one emerging from the majority's opinion." I& at 155 (Marshall,
J., dissenting).
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of citizenship regardless of their racial or ethnic origin.112
Thus, in Stevens' vision, when the blacks objected to the street
closing, they objected to carrying the ordinary burdens of citizen-
ship. Similarly, in the nineteenth-century version, the black citizens
in the Civil Rights Cases refused to accept the ordinary burdens
of citizenship and sought special treatment."3 Stevens also sug-
gested in the above-quoted passage that any sense of stigma felt
by blacks was constitutionally trivial and, in any event, was a
product of the black person's misunderstanding of the nature of
the governmental action. 14 This echoes the argument in Plessy
that the blacks misunderstood the message of de jure segregation
and simply imagined a message of racial inferiority in the laws."15
These arguments, in the Civil Rights Cases, Plessy, and now in
their contemporary form in Greene, are advanced by the rhetoric
of black abstraction.
3. Croson and the White Victims of Affirmative Action
Perhaps the most divisive contemporary race issue is that of
affirmative action. 16 In City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,117 the
Court took what Justice Marshall in dissent called "a deliberate
and giant step backward in [the] Court's affirmative action juris-
prudence.""8 The majority in Croson concluded that the city's set
aside of thirty percent of the subcontracting work on city con-
struction jobs for minority firms was an unconstitutional denial of
equal protection of the law to the white contractors."9
The closest analog to Croson in the nineteenth-century cases is
the Civil Rights Cases.20 In each case, the Court considered and
rejected governmental efforts to meet a perceived specter of racial
discrimination. And in each instance, the Court used the rhetorical
themes of abstraction and innocence.
Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court in Croson expressed
perfectly the theme of black abstraction. She rejected the premise
112. Id. at 128.
113. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
114. Greene, 451 U.S. at 128.
115. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
116. See Kennedy, supra note 34.
117. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
118. Id. at 529 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
119. "Because the city of Richmond has failed to identify the need for remedial action in
the awarding of its public construction contracts, its treatment of its citizens on a racial
basis violates the dictates of the Equal Protection Clause." Croson, 488 U.S. at 511.
120. See supra notes 33-47 and accompanying text.
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of racial discrimination in the construction industry in Richmond,
Virginia. She labeled the City Council's premises as "generalized
assertions" and "amorphous claims."'12 1 O'Connor dismissed large
statistical disparities in the black population and black participa-
tion in construction work for the city as the wrong set of num-
bers.12
O'Connor's arguments work well on a rhetorical field apart from
the history and reality of Richmond, Virginia. Again, Marshall
revealed the black abstraction at work in the majority opinion.
Marshall dissented and wrote of Richmond's "disgraceful history"
of race relations. 1' He argued: "[A] majority of this Court signals
that it regards racial discrimination as largely a phenomenon of
the past, and that government bodies need no longer preoccupy
themselves with rectifying racial injustice. I, however, do not
believe this Nation is anywhere close to eradicating racial discrim-
ination or its vestiges."'' Marshall told the stories of Richmond's
massive resistance to school integration, its efforts to dilute the
black vote, and other state-sanctioned racial discrimination in
Richmond.'2 He thus tried to shift the rhetorical field, to move
into a vividly depicted social context. 26 He fought against the
abstraction of O'Connor's rhetoric.
Justice Scalia's concurring opinion embodied both of the rhetor-
ical themes but was especially impassioned in its expression of
white innocence. He spoke of the white victims of affirmative
action. When we implement affirmative action, "we play with fire,
and much more than an occasional DeFunis, Johnson, or Croson
burns."' 27 Scalia spoke of those who might seek to "even the score"
and suggested that innocent whites might suffer unjustly at the
hands of blacks.'2 In this rhetorical work, Scalia expressed a
theme of white innocence that can be connected with the nine-
teenth-century rhetoric. He also invited a connection with another
piece of the public rhetoric of the nineteenth century-the fear of
black insurrection and revenge. 29 Both connections depend on the
121. Croson, 488 U.S. at 499-500.
122. Id. at 500-02.
123. Id. at 528-35 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
124. Id- at 552 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
125. Id. at 544-45 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
126. See Ross, supra note 14, at 405-09.
127. Croson, 488 U.S. at 527 (Scalia, J., concurring).
128. Id. at 528 (Scalia, J., concurring).
129. In his treatise on the practical impossibility of emancipation, Professor Dew described
the specter of black insurrection:
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conception of the potential victimization of the innocent white
person.
Thus, in Milliken, Greene, and Croson, we made intellectually
tolerable our own choices through a rhetoric that bore a disturbing
similarity to the rhetoric of those nineteenth-century cases we
now disavow. This alone ought to make us reconsider our contem-
porary choices. A more careful consideration of the precise nature
and cultural significance of the ideas of white innocence and black
abstraction provides yet more reason to reconsider this way of
talking.
IV. WHITE INNOCENCE AND BLACK ABSTRACTION
A. White Innocence
To understand the power of the theme of white innocence, one
must begin with the power of the cultural conception of innocence.
To be innocent is an important thing everywhere in our culture.
The argument for the white person's innocence in matters of race
connects with the cultural ideas of innocence and defilement. The
very contrast between the colors, white and black, is often a
symbol for the contrast between innocence and defilement. Thus,
the theme of white innocence in the legal rhetoric of race draws
its power from more than the obvious advantage of pushing away
responsibility. It draws power from the cultural, religious, and
sexual themes its terms suggest.
White and black often symbolize some form of good and bad.130
Black or darkness has been the symbol of evil for many Western
cultures. Darkness is, in many Western religions, a symbol of the
anti-God, Satan by any name.13 1 "Black magic" is often used to
[IIH]is very worthlessness and degradation will stimulate him to deeds of rapine
and vengeance; he will oftener engage in plots and massacres ... every year
you would hear of insurrections and plots, and every day would perhaps record
a murder . . .the tender mother [would] shed the tear of horror over her
babe as she clasped it to her bosom; others of a deeper die would thicken
upon us; those regions where the brightness of polished life has dawned and
brightened into full day, would relapse into darkness, thick and full of hor-
rors ....
T. DEW, supra note 7, at 101-02. See generally K. STAMPP, THE PECULIAR INSTITUTION:
SLAVERY IN THE ANTE-BELLUM SOUTH (1956).
130. "Blackness and darkness are almost always associated with evil, in opposition to the
association of whiteness and light with good." J. RUSSELL, THE DEVIL: PERCEPTIONS OF EVIL
FROM ANTIQUITY TO PRIMITIVE CHRISTIANITY 64-65 (1977).
131. "During the period of the witch epidemic the demon appeared most often of all as
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describe a perverse form of magic and worship. In Christian sects,
darkened churches symbolize the days of Lent, whereas the glory
of Easter is a time to throw open the windows and let in the
light.
The sexual connotations of white innocence are many and com-
plex.13 2 Put simply, white often symbolizes innocence as chaste,
whereas black symbolizes noninnocence, as in the defiled and the
defiler. In our culture, the white wedding dress is a double symbol
of the connection between white and innocence and the significance
of sexual innocence of women.
The black person is often depicted as the sexual defiler. For
example, Shakespeare's depiction of Othello, although an uncom-
monly rich portrait of a black person in literature, expressed the
idea of the black as sexual defiler.3 The stereotypical conception
of the black person as sexually wanton is longstanding.'3
The contrast between black and white in its sexual context is
most vividly captured in miscegenation statutes, always accom-
panied by images of the black man's defilement of the white
a 'black man." R.E.L. MASTERS, EROS AND EVIL 15 (1962). "The Devil's blackness may
derive from his association with darkness, which symbolizes death, annihilation, and the
terrors of the night." J. RUSSELL, supra note 130, at 253. "Sometimes the devil wears green
or grey, but mostly he is dressed in black ... W. WOODS, A HISTORY OF THE DEVIL 185
(1973).
132. See Ross, supra note 1, at 309-10.
133. See P. MASON, RACE RELATIONS 63 (1970); see also J. WASHINGTON, JR., ANTI-BLACKNESS
IN ENGLISH RELIGION: 1500-1800, at 87 (1984).
134. It is clear that among Englishmen there was indeed a vague prejudice against
blacks even before the first colonists set foot in North America. As a result
of early contacts with Africa, Englishmen tended to associate blackness with
savagery, heathenism, and general failure to conform to European standards
of civilization and propriety. Contributing to this predisposition to look upon
Negroes with disfavor were the conscious and unconscious connotations of the
color black. The association of black with evil was of course deeply rooted in
Western and Christian mythology; it was natural to think of Satan as the
Prince of Darkness and of witchcraft as black magic. On the unconscious level,
twentieth-century psychoanalysts have suggested, blackness or darkness can
be associated with suppressed libidinous impulses. Carl Gustav Jung has even
argued that the Negro became for European whites a symbol of the unconscious
itself-of what he calls "the shadow"-the whole suppressed or rejected side
of the human psyche. The rudiments of such a complex may have manifested
themselves in Elizabethan England. A tendency to project upon blacks the
kind of libidinous sexuality that whites tried to suppress in themselves would
certainly have been helped along by a hazy and inaccurate knowledge of
African sexual practices and by a smirking consideration of what was implied
by the fact that many Africans went around completely or virtually naked.
ARROGANCE, supra note 8, at 191.
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woman.135 Commentators on southern culture have noted the re-
curring mythology of the black man as the oversexed, large, would-
be defiler of the innocent white woman.136 Griffith's epic motion
picture, "Birth of a Nation," depicts the suicide of the innocent
white woman seeking to avoid the touch of the black man, whom
Griffith has portrayed as a slobbering beast.137
This connection is still with us. Our media's obsession with the
violent sexual assault of a white woman by a group of blacks in
the "Central Park jogger" case1as suggests that the sexual conno-
tation of white innocence persists.3 9 The notion of the black person
as oversexed and dirty is part of our cultural stereotypes. 40 The
unconscious racism which our culture continues to teach expresses
the terror of the black defiler of the innocent white. In 1966,
Loving v. Virginia4' finally declared unconstitutional our most
vivid legal expression of this form of racism, the miscegenation
statutes, although the Court's opinion lacked any real expression
of outrage.
The rhetorical theme of white innocence thus connects with the
cultural, religious, and sexual notions of innocence, sin, and defile-
ment. The power of the rhetoric comes in part from its ability to
conjure in us at some unconscious level the always implied contrast
to white innocence, viz, the black one who is both defiled and the
potential defiler.
White innocence is thus a special rhetorical device. When the
nineteenth-century Justices insisted on white innocence as part of
135. In Latin American society, marriage limited to one's own color led to a mystic
transposition of the wife before the altar of God. The symbolism of the color
white played a preponderant role in this transposition .... White signified
purity, innocence, and virginity. A woman whose skin was not entirely white
suggested the carnal merely by her color.
Bastide, Color, Racism, and Christianity, in COLOR AND RACE 34, 40 (1968).
136. "[Tlhe growing myth of the black man as a genetic sexual monster fanned the
Negrophobia of the 1890s, a myth encouraged by novelists such as Thomas Nelson Page
and later trumpeted by Thomas Dixon, Jr." J. KINNEY, AMALGAMATION! 153 (1985).
137. See W. WADE, THE FIERY CRoss: THE Ku KLUX KLAN IN AMERICA 119-39 (1987).
138. See 3 Youths Guilty of Rape And Assault of Jogger, N.Y. Times, Aug. 19, 1990, at 1,
col. 1.
139. "[Elven though whites express much less biological racism and much more support
for the principles of racial equality and integration than they used to, they can still find
plenty of reasons to object to one or another forms of actual change in the racial status
quo' Hochschild & Herk, "Yes, But ..." Principles and Caveats in American Racial
Attitudes, in NOMOS XXXII-MAJORITIES AND MINORITIES 316 (1990). One of the white caveats
to change relates to social contacts between men and women of different races. Id. at 312.
140. "[Rlacially prejudiced people. . . believe the out-group is dirty, lazy, oversexed, and
without control of their instincts (a typical accusation against blacks)." Lawrence, supra
note 101, at 333.
141. 388 U.S. 1 (1966).
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the rhetorical veneer placed over the choices to subjugate the
black, they were inviting the reader to draw on the cultural themes
of innocence. These cultural themes of innocence in the nineteenth-
century context invited in turn images of the black as the sexual
defiler, as the very embodiment of sin or evil.
The irony is that the rhetoric of white innocence was arguably
less powerful in its nineteenth-century version because these cul-
tural connections and images were part of accepted public ideology
and discourse. People spoke publicly of blacks as degenerate, dirty,
and beast-like. The rhetoric of white innocence thus might have
been merely an alternative way of expressing a widely accepted
vision of blacks and whites-the vision of blunt and explicit racism.
On the other hand, the rhetoric of white innocence in its con-
temporary form may be rhetorically more powerful. Our public
ideology and discourse is one of nonracism. Judges cannot say out
loud that blacks are inferior. Lawyers cannot make arguments
with the explicit premises of racism. When the contemporary
rhetoric of white innocence invites the cultural connections and
images, we may be tapping into a repressed vein of unconscious
racism which cannot be expressed in any way but indirectly and
metaphorically.
We thus ought to set aside the rhetoric of white innocence for
several reasons. First, its family resemblance to the rhetoric of
cases we now disavow makes it suspect. Second, when we consider
the implicit premises of our claim to innocence, we see a much
more complicated set of circumstances. Finally, when we consider
the cultural connections that the rhetoric invites and the fact that
those connections are part of the unconscious racism that persists
in our culture, we have the most powerful reason of all to stop
talking this way.
B. Black Abstraction
In various ways, legal rhetoric denied, or obscured, the full
humanness of the black person. By doing so, we made legally
coherent the nineteenth-century legal choices first to enslave and
thereafter to segregate the black person. Slavery became legally
coherent when the subject was not human. De jure segregation
became legally coherent when whites supposed that blacks suffered
no harm and experienced no stigma, except perhaps a self-imposed
stigma.
As we employed black abstraction in legal rhetoric, we also
typically depicted the black as something less than a full human
in literature and art. With but several notable exceptions, Amer-
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ican writers either ignored the black or depicted him as a simple,
one-dimensional character. 142 Until the public emergence of the
black literary artist in the twentieth century, American public
literature was generally the product of white authors and generally
depicted the black as either a saint, a suffering victim, or a wild
beast.14 American art similarly depicted the black as a unidimen-
sional figure. 44 In most instances, black persons occupy the shad-
ows, the periphery of paintings, or are depicted as one of several
common stereotypes.
In either legal rhetoric or artistic expression, the denial of the
full humanness of the black person has been a central and tragic
part of our discourse. Black abstraction functioned as a lens
through which we remade the context in which our choices were
played out. We abstracted away the pieces of reality that might
have made those choices less comfortable.
142. Sterling Brown, a black poet and literary theorist, eloquently spoke of this phenom-
enon: "Whether the Negro was human was one of the problems that racked the brains of
the cultured Old South. The finally begrudged admission that perhaps he was, has remained
largely nominal in letters as in life. Complete, complex humanity has been denied to him."
S. BROWN, THE NEGRO IN AMERICAN FICTION 2-3 (1937); see also D. BRODERICK, IMAGE OF THE
BLACK IN CHILDREN'S FICTION (1973); IMAGES OF THE NEGRO IN AMERICAN LITERATURE (S.
Gross & J. Hardy eds. 1966).
143. The late arrival of black authors to public literature was obviously a legacy of the
laws which forbade the education of blacks in the pre-Civil War period and assured blacks,
at best, unequal educational opportunities in the post-Civil War period. Racism was, and is,
part of the explanation of the absence of blacks from any particular public place, including
public mainstream American literature. Blacks, in fact, created literature throughout our
history. For a critical reading of this literature, see H. GATES, JR., FIGURES IN BLACK:
WORDS, SIGNS, AND THE "RACIAL" SELF (1987).
On the stereotypical depiction point, see N. TISCHLER, BLACK MASKS: NEGRO CHARACTERS
IN MODERN SOUTHERN FICTION (1969):
Until recently, very few authors have been able to pierce the veil of idealization
or stereotyping to look honestly at the Negro. Noble savages populated
eighteenth century fiction and philosophic mammies replaced them in the
nineteenth century . . . . [T]he usual catalogue of Negro stereotypes [in Amer-
ican fiction include]: the tragic mulatto, the comic Sambo, and the faithful
retainer.
Id. at 24. In the racist vision, the depiction is natural, of course, not stereotypical. See J.
NELSON, THE NEGRO CHARACTER IN AMERICAN LITERATURE (1926). Professor Nelson closed
his review of the depiction of blacks in American literature with this sentence: "Without
exemplifying exalted qualities or filling the position of epic hero, [the black] has proved a
great comic type, and for many decades has lent to much of American fiction a raciness,
an enlivening element, a savor of the natural and primitive which could ill be spared." Id.
at 137.
144. The artistic stereotypical depiction of blacks was the theme of a recent art exhibit,
Facing History: The Black Image in American Art 1710-1940, at the Corcoran Gallery of Art
in Washington, D.C. See Kimmelman, Black Images of the Past: Servile, Subhuman, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 18, 1990, at C21, col. 3. See generally 4 H. HONOUR, THE IMAGE OF THE BLACK
IN WESTERN ART pts. 1, 2 (1989).
THE RHETORICAL TAPESTRY OF RACE
Black abstraction also worked in another equally tragic way. In
addition to the rhetorical functions of giving an implicit logic to
slavery and de jure segregation and making intellectually tolerable
the reality of contemporary de facto segregation and the law's
retreat from addressing that segregation and its implications, this
black abstraction, in law and elsewhere in our culture, makes more
difficult the empathetic response of the white person to the suf-
fering of the black person. Empathy, as used here, connotes the
capacity to share, in some imperfect way, in the suffering of
another person. We easily can achieve some degree of empathy
for the suffering of those whom we think of as familiar. Although
the empathy may not move us to personal sacrifice or even to a
lesser intervention in any particular case, we understand their
suffering because we have an obvious and easily accessible analog,
our own suffering. We have a more difficult time achieving em-
pathy for the suffering of people we think of as unfamiliar. We
can separate ourselves more easily from their circumstances; we
can simply not imagine that they suffer; we can suppose some
sense of justice in whatever suffering we are forced to see.145
When we see that white innocence and black abstraction fill
our legal rhetoric of race, we have reason to doubt that our choices
are any better than the nineteenth-century choices that stain our
legal history. We have reason to wonder whether our choices are
made from any real sense of empathy with those who suffer. We
have reason to doubt the justice of it all.
White innocence and black abstraction make us more comfort-
able in our choices. They helped make coherent the despicable
legal choices of the nineteenth century. They continue to serve in
contemporary legal choices about race. Yet, they provide a source
of shelter that we should struggle to give up. We should struggle
to see the problematic quality of white innocence and the "make
believe" world depicted through black abstraction.
V. A TURN TO NARRATIVE
Changing the way we talk about race is not simply a matter of
resolve. We cannot slough off the assumptions and attitudes that
determine in part the language we use. White innocence and black
abstraction never have been simply rhetorical structures that we
145. See Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1574 (1987); Massaro,
Empathy, Legal Storytelling, and the Rule of Law: New Words, Old Wounds?, 87 MICH. L.
REV. 2099 (1989). See generally R. RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY AND SOLIDARITY (1989).
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made up by ourselves. They always have been a product of both
the imagination of the rhetorician and the influences of history
and culture. To change truly the way we talk about race requires
a parallel change in attitudes and assumptions. As language and
rhetoric shape assumptions and ideas, assumptions and ideas shape
language and rhetoric. This intertwined relation is what makes a
change in language and rhetoric so powerful, and so difficult. It
is thus a struggle.
In this struggle, we may turn to narrative. Both white innocence
and black abstraction are rhetorically vulnerable to the power of
narrative. Although narrative can be used to distance others, as
in Justice Taney's narrative of subjugation, it can also edify. When
the black person is depicted as a fully-rounded human being living
within a rich social context in the midst of a culture and a history,
the black person's humanness cannot be forgotten or obscured.
The reality of stigmatization, humiliation, and pain brought on by
segregation and the racism that motivates segregation crushes the
rhetoric of formal equality and self-imposed stigmas. Moreover,
the innocence of the white person becomes a more complex matter.
When we see the collective choices of whites as a flight from
intimacy with black persons, as a fear of the intimacy of neigh-
borhood, school, family, and physical relations, and when we imag-
ine the pain and anger this must impose on those from whom
whites flee, we cannot simply nod acknowledgement at the premise
of white innocence in the rhetoric of race.
There are those who can help in this struggle. The storytellers
are here. Justice Thurgood Marshall has never ceased his insis-
tence on narrative and his struggle against the abstract depiction
of blacks. He is not alone. 146 We need only listen and hear. Hearing
the stories will not provide any easy answers. It will give us
something much less comforting, but essential. It will increase the
chance that our choices on matters of race, however hard and
problematic, will not become in history a story of tragedy and a
source of shame.
146. One could not possibly list all our important storytellers. To support this textual
point, I simply list here some of those whose stories I have heard. They are Derrick Bell,
Charles Black, Leon Higginbotham, Charles Lawrence, Mari Matsuda, and Patricia Williams.
See D. BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE (1987); A.
HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., supra note 29; Black, My World with Louis Armstrong, 95 YALE L.J.
1595 (1986); Lawrence, supra note 101; Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies
and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323 (1987); Williams, The Obliging Shell An
Informal Essay on Formal Equal Opportunity, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2128 (1989).
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